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At present, governmental accounting reforms are extensively being carried out 
in western countries and have been paid highly close attention to by related 
international organizations. But the researchers have made clear that there exist an 
inconsistent problem named as “performance paradox”. The paper takes 
neo-institutional economics, public choice and other subjects as theoretical bases, 
clarifies the contractual and institutional natures of governmental accounting in 
theory, then progressively explains clearly the cause of formation of this problem, 
and puts forward some proposals about how to reform budget accounting and 
establish governmental accounting in our country. This research not only expands 
further the contents and improves the explanatory power of governmental 
accounting theories, which makes up the theoretical deficiency of discussing the 
problems of governmental accounting reforms only from technical point of view, but 
also is helpful for our country to recognize accurately, systematically and roundly 
the experience and lessons of governmental accounting reforms in western countries 
and draw up scientific reasonable viable strategies of governmental accounting 
reforms. 
As economic organizations, governmental sectors are productive firms, which 
are charge of supplying public goods. They are essentially the connex of contracts. 
Under this assumption, governmental accounting simultaneously has contractual and 
institutional natures: the former means that governmental accounting itself is a kind 
of bounded incomplete contract and contributes to agree to, perform and relieve 
governmental contracts. But it takes effect on the prerequisite that rational economic 
entities demand and utilize governmental accounting information in order to 
supervise agents and make decisions; the latter means that governmental accounting 
is at least in line with related institutions in form and lends itself to institutional 
pressures. So, it becomes the institutional results and actual carriers to a great degree. 
In the mass, these two objective natures require that we should recognize 
governmental accounting problems respectively from the “efficiency mechanism” 
and the “legitimacy mechanism”.  













or replacement of contracts. However, it usually gives expression to applying a new 
governmental accounting model or technical tool in broad terms. In addition, this 
nature won’t alter, although governmental accounting reforms are due to related 
institutional change. To a governmental sector supplying public goods, accounting 
reforms generally serve to achieve two goals, namely ensure contractual efficiency 
and improve contractual legitimacy, which separately accord with the contractual 
and institutional natures of governmental accounting. But their requests to 
governmental accounting are probably completely inconsistent, even sometimes as 
wide as poles apart. This exactly becomes a sally port of researching the cause of 
formation of governmental accounting reforms “performance paradox”. Moreover, 
this also determines that we should focus on the macroscopical institutions 
influencing governmental accounting reforms and the microcosmic contracts and 
their incentive effect in a single governmental sector. 
It is necessary that microcosmic governmental accounting reforms are 
promoted by macroscopical institutional change. The institutions are internalized in 
the accounting contracts of every governmental sector by means of enforcement or 
incentive. When a governmental sector performs accounting reforms, it will achieve 
the goal of improving contractual legitimacy. It will also establish a new accounting 
form and make contracting entities' conditions of obtaining information better, 
namely in addition to budget information, it will help them receive more information, 
which is beneficial for them to supervise agents. But because of the restrictions of 
incentive structure factors, governmental accounting information is hard to influence 
the quantity of supervising agents. So, governmental accounting information is not 
necessarily utilized to supervise agents. Then, agent problems and agency cost will 
not decrease and the performance of governmental sectors supplying public goods 
will not enhance. Under this condition, the problem of governmental accounting 
reforms “performance paradox” will appear. Obviously, governmental accounting 
reforms are a very complex and challenging systemic undertaking. 
This paper’s innovations are mainly presented as follows: 
1. Chooses the problem of governmental accounting reforms “performance 
paradox” as research subject and explains why governmental accounting reforms are 
not necessarily achieve the expected goal of high performance in theory. It breaks 













accounting reforms only from its necessity and implementation methods in our 
country. 
2. Looks on governmental sectors as productive firms responsible for supplying 
public goods and clarifies their economic nature as the connex of contracts. On this 
basis, the paper also demonstrates the contractual and institutional natures of 
governmental accounting and differentiates between governmental accounting and 
its related institutions. 
3. Deeply researches the economic nature and goals of governmental 
accounting reforms at the micro-level, which breaks through the limitations of 
researching the problems of governmental accounting reforms only from adopting a 
new technical tool in order to improve governmental sectors’ performance. 
4. Deeply researching the institutions effecting governmental accounting 
reforms. Public accountability, new public management and fiscal transparency are 
all regarded as informal institutions (mainly ideologies). And this paper elaborates 
the characters of these ideologies effecting governmental accounting reforms. 
5. Systematically analyzes the contracts and their incentive effect of 
bureaucrats, politicians and the general public. On this basis, the paper also 
discusses their behaviors to treat governmental accounting information, which 
avoids the research defect of transcendentally supposing that users will 
spontaneously demand and utilize governmental accounting information. 
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第一节  选题研究的动机及意义 
一、选题研究的动机 















                                                        
① [美] Donald F. Kettl. 张怡译. 有效政府——全球公共管理革命[M] . 上海：上海交通大学出版社，2005，



















- 2 - 
有关国际组织对世界各国的政府会计改革给予了密切关注并加以研究，其
中取得重大成果的当属国际会计师联合会（ International Federation of 
Accountants，IFAC）。1996 年，IFAC 成立了专门负责制定发布权责发生制公共
部门会计准则的公共部门委员会（Public Sector Committee，PSC），并于 2004
年将其进一步更名为国际公共部门会计准则理事会（International Public Sector 






际公共部门会计准则（International Public Sector Accounting Standards，IPSASs），
并且对其中的 11 项进行了修订，初步建立了核心的公共部门（包括政府机构）
会计准则体系（见表 1-1）。为了进一步完善 IPSASs 体系，IPSASB 目前正在努
力进行以下工作：为现有的国际财务报告准则（International Financial Reporting 
Standards，IFRSs）中尚未涉及的公共部门特有的会计问题制定规范，并且发布
了关于税收和转移支付的非交换收入处理的第 23 号具体准则；将已发布的
IPSASs 与国际货币基金组织（the International Monetary Fund，IMF）的政府财
政统计手册（Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001，GFSM）相协调；以及
按改进后的 IFRSs 修订现行的 IPSASs，并于 2007 年 1 月发布了对已存在的 11
项具体会计准则进行修订的公告②。而且，IMF、世界银行（the World Bank，
WB）、OECD 以及亚洲发展银行（Asian Development Bank，ADB）等其他国际
或区域性组织也都在以不同方式积极倡导和推动各个国家进行政府会计改革。 
 
                                                        
① IFAC, PSC., “Governmental Financial Reporting: Accounting Issues and Practices,”[R]. Study 11, May 2000. 













第一章  导论 
- 3 - 
表 1-1：权责发生制国际公共部门会计准则一览表 
准则公告顺序 发布日期 准则公告名称 已修订
第 1 号 2000 年 5 月 财务报表的列报 √ 
第 2 号 2000 年 5 月 现金流量表  
第 3 号 2000 年 5 月 期间净盈余或赤字、重大会计差错和会计政策变
更 √ 
第 4 号 2000 年 5 月 汇率变动的影响 √ 
第 5 号 2000 年 5 月 借款费用  
第 6 号 2000 年 5 月 合并财务报表和受控主体会计 √ 
第 7 号 2000 年 5 月 联营企业投资会计 √ 
第 8 号 2000 年 5 月 合营企业权益的财务报告 √ 
第 9 号 2001 年 7 月 交换交易的收入  
第 10 号 2001 年 7 月 恶性通货膨胀经济中的财务报告  
第 11 号 2001 年 7 月 建造合同  
第 12 号 2001 年 7 月 存货 √ 
第 13 号 2001 年 12 月 租赁 √ 
第 14 号 2001 年 12 月 报告日后事项 √ 
第 15 号 2001 年 12 月 金融工具：披露与列报  
第 16 号 2001 年 12 月 投资性房地产 √ 
第 17 号 2001 年 12 月 不动产、厂场和设备 √ 
第 18 号 2002 年 6 月 分部报告  
第 19 号 2002 年 10 月 准备、或有负债和或有资产  
第 20 号 2002 年 10 月 关联方披露  
第 21 号 2004 年 12 月 非赚取现金资产的减值  
第 22 号 2006 年 12 月 一般政府部门财务信息的披露  
第 23 号 2006 年 12 月 非交换交易（税收和转移支付）收入  
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（1998）④、Robinson（1998）⑤、Bogt 和 Helden（2000）⑥以及 Caperchione（2003）
⑦的相关研究都证实了上述观点。这表明，政府会计改革所宣称的预期绩效目标
                                                        
① [美]Lye, L., H. Perera and A. Rahman., “The Evolution of Accrual-based Crown (Government) Financial 
Statements in New Zealand,” [J]. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 18, No. 6 (2005), 
pp.784-815. 
② [英]Wildavsky, A., “Understanding Organizational Change: OMB and GAO — A Review,” [J]. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 13, No. 1(1988), pp. 107-109. 
③ [英]Humphrey, C., P. Miller and R. W. Scapers., “Accountability and Accountable Management in the UK 






异应当加以研究。见：[澳]Guthrie, J., “Application of Accrual Accounting in the Australian Public Sector — 






时必须考虑服务于这种目的，而不是假定的微观经济优势。见：[澳]Robinson, M., “Accrual Accounting and 







的内外在因素），以及比引入业绩预算和提升绩效要求更宽泛的政治目标。[荷]Bogt, H. J. and G. J. Helden., 
“Accounting Change in Dutch Government: Exploring the Gap between Expectations and Realizations,” [J]. 
Management Accounting Research, Vol. 11 No.3 (2000), pp. 263-279. 




用于大量的目的。[意]Caperchione, E., “Local Government Accounting System Reform in Italy: A Critical 
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